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The author is Senior Lecturer and Permanent Fellow,
John Paul II In stitute for Marriage and Family, in Melbourne, Australia

1. New Issues
The purpose of this paper is to identify some new issues in relation to organ
donation and some arguments for alternative views on each issue. The
parameters for what constitutes a new issue are:
a) Changes to technology that affect the assumptions on
which the resolution of issues has been based;
b) Indications that there may be a shift in what is
considered to be good medical practice and in the values
being espoused by health professionals;
c) New or different challenges to the values that have been
accepted as good practice.

•

In the use of cadaveric organs and tissue there seem to be several new
issues:
a) Registering consent rather than intent
b) Donation after controlled death
c) Differing standards over what is meant by "Brain
Death"
d) Use of less than suitable organs
e) The role of the Designated Officer
t) Justice and organ allocation
g) Mutual consent to donor family-recipient contact
h) Information, consent and disclosure of material factors
that indicate donor identity.
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In the use of organs and tissues from living donors the following
issues are of new or renewed interest:
a) Bodily integrity and "donation" by children and other
dependant persons;
b) Donors of greater health risk;
c) Partial liver and lung lobe donation;
d) Donation of less than ideal organs;
e) Assessment of unrelated living donors;
1) Paired and remunerated living donation;
g) Information, consent and disclosure of material factors;
that indicate donor identity;
h) Internet canvassing for organs - privacy, exploitation
and justice issues.

2. Issues in Deceased Organ Donation
2.1 The National Organ Donation Consent Register
The recent establishment, by the Australian Health Ministers, of a
new national organ donation consent register is a shift from what was an
expression of one's wishes indicating intent, to a registered consent that is
legally sufficient to pennit the removal of organs after death. This raises
questions about whether such a consent overrides the objections of family
members after death has occurred.
An argument against allowing families to override registered consent
by the deceased is that it is a matter of respect for autonomy that the
deceased's wishes be respected and the consent register will improve the
•
organ donation rate.
The atguments for allowing family members to override include the
fact that it is accepted medical practice to respect the grieving process and
not to antagonize families at that time. The donor is dead and it is the living
who become the primary concern of the intensive care unit. It is in fact the
living who make sacrifices in relation to allowing organ donation,
foregoing the ordinary process of being with the relative during the normal
process of death and coping with trying to understand brain death.
2.2 Donation after cardiac death I
The "Maastricht" categories for non-heart-beating donors 2 , now
tern1ed "donation after cardiac death" (OeD) donors, have been developed
as a way to divide potential donors on a clinical basis and are widely
accepted internationally.
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Category I: Dead on scene (out of hospital) - Unknown warm ischaemic
time: "Uncontrolled"
Category II: Unsuccessful resuscitation- Known warm ischaemic time:
"Uncontrolled"
Category III: Waiting cardiac death after planned treatment withdrawal Known and limited warm ischaemic time: "Controlled"
Category IV: Cardiac arrest after confirmation of brain death but before
planned organ procurement - Known and potentially limited warm
ischaemic time: "Uncontrolled"
In category II uncontrolled donors, the donor may die and the
transplant team arrive before the donor 's next of kin can be contacted. It is
controversial whether cannulation and perfusion can be started in these
circumstances. On one hand, it can be considered a violation of the
potential donor's autonomy to cannulate before their in-life wishes are
known. On the other hand, delay in cannulation may mean that a patient's
strongly-held wish to be a donor cannot be respected.
Some hold the view that a doctor's duty of care to the still-living
outweighs any duty of care to the dead . A compromise that may be reached
is to cannulate if there is any evidence of a wish to donate (such as a donor
card or registration as a donor) even in the absence of next-of-kin.
There have been new developments of organ procurement following
death from cessation of circulation in controlled circumstances (Category
III). The timing of the death is planned, in a sense, as it happens as a result
of deliberate withdrawal of ventilation. The decision to withdraw treatment
is made, presumably on justifiable grounds such as that the ventilation is
intrusive and may be considered overly burdensome when there is little or
,
no prospect of recovery.
The issues that then arise include how much time must elapse after
the heart stops beating before efforts may be made to recover organs and
tissue, and whether procedures done for the purpose of preserving organs
may begin before death has been determined. The proposals are to institute
pharmaceutical therapy such as anti-coagulants and to undertake surgery to
place large catheters in the femoral arteries to facilitate cold perfusion of
organs after death. Such procedures done on persons who are still alive are
not therapeutic for them, and the question arises as to whether anyone has
the authority to consent to non-therapeutic procedures on the patient's
behalf. It is assumed that the patient could consent to the procedures, if
able to do so, as an act of altruism. However, provision of medical
interventions, without the specific consent of the person, is not lawful in
most jurisdictions where those interventions are not being used to save that
person's life, prevent serious damage to their health, or alleviate significant
pain or suffering.
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Arguments against ante-mortem procedures to facilitate organ
preservation in the absence of a specific expression of consent by the
patient include the view that consent to organ donation presumes that death
will have occurred and the literature up until now has tended to be
reassuring in that respect. Consent to donation after death cannot be
presumed to be consent to procedures done prior to death. Second, the next
of kin or other representatives do not have the legal authority, in most
jurisdictions, to consent to non-therapeutic procedures. There is also
concern that the issue may confuse the already vexed issue of donation
after death by the brain criterion.
Arguments for ante-mortem procedures include the view that if the
patient wanted to be a donor, then it is in his or her interests for the
procedures to be done in order to facilitate donation. The procedures
increase the availability and the quality of the organs able to be obtained.
Thus arguably given that he or she wanted to be a donor, he or she would
have wanted ante-mortem procedures to be done to facilitate that donation.
There is an issue in thi s over what it means for something to be in
someone's best interests. Is the phrase "best interests" synonymous with
"preferred would or would have been preferred" or does the phrase have
meaning in terms some sense of being objectively related to that person's
well-being, etc. There does seem to be a sense in which I can prefer that
which is not in my best interests. That is implied in the phrase "altruistic
preference."
The manner in which death is to be diagnosed after withdrawal of
ventilation and cessation of circulation is also problematic. The legal
definition generally covers the two possibilities of irreversible cessation of
all function of the brain or in'eversible cessation of circulation. There is a
move in some protocols to use the phrase "permanellt cessation of
circulation," which has a slightly different meaning. Having decided not to
restore ventilation and not to attempt resuscitation , cessation of circulation
may indeed be permanent, but not irreversible. Is not being able to be
resuscitated a criterion for determining death by the circulation criterion, or
has death occurred simply when circulation has ceased?
Obviously the timing is crucial, if one must wait until irreversibility,
then one will presumably have lost the use of a viable heart for
transplantation, and may have lost other organs that are sensitive to warm
ischaemia, such as the liver or the insulin producing islets from the
pancreas.
A soluti on may be to insist that sufficient time has elapsed for a
determination to be made that irreversible cessation of brain function has
occurred. There are considerable arguments amongst clinicians about what
constitutes sufficient time and the protocols differ from one place to
another.
November, 2006
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My view is that in the interests of community understanding and
acceptance of deceased organ donation, there should be no moderation of
the current definition of death and that the notion of irreversibility should
be retained.
A possible interpretation of irreversibility in this context is to say that
the cessation of circulation is irreversible unless overly burdensome and
unwelcome interventions are re-established. This would allow the
diagnosis of death even though "death" is not strictly irreversible.

2.3 Differing standards over what is meant by "Brain Death"
There are challenges to the consensus in relation to the determination
of death by the cessation of brain function criterion. The challenges are
numerous and from both directions. Some are arguing for a more relaxed
standard than cessation of all function of the brain, and there are
indications of some medical acceptance of the view that brain death can be
determined even though some brain functions continue. This is the position
that is now held by the Australia and New Zealand Intensive Care Society
and may be regarded as the new orthodoxy. At the other extreme some are
arguing that the original consensus was mistaken and that a person remains
integrated and alive, even though brain function has ceased.
Death of a human being is the end of the life of that being.
Historically that was associated with the permanent cessation of respiration
and circulation. When that happened the breakdown of the body,
putrefaction, began soon after. Theologically (across religions and
cultures) it was thought that that breakdown of the body indicated that the
life force or soul had gone. The link between cessation of cardiac and
respiratory function and inevitable putrefaction allowed death to be diagnosed by cardiac and respiratory failure. In Christian f)ractice it was still
possible to administer the sacraments (which can only be administered to
the living) until putrefaction, even if respiration and circulation had ceased.

The Advent of Brain Death
In modem times, ventilators permitted respiration without brain stem
function and thus interrupted what would have been a progression from
death of the brain stem to cessation of respiration, cessation of cardiac
function and then death of the tissue generally (putrefaction). This
challenged traditional notions of death and gave rise to the notion of
determining death by the cessation of all brain function, or "brain death".
This was the standard medical view for which medical criteria were
devised in the 1970s known as the Harvard criteria and accepted by the US
President's Commission in 198P and by the Royal Colleges of Medicine
in the UK.
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Recent Bioethical Discussion

More recently, there has been some acceptance that death has
occuned when there is permanent loss of consciousness and loss of the
capacity for spontaneous respiration. By these cliteria, "brain death" may
be diagnosed even though some functions of the brain (other than
consciousness) may be retained. Some bioethicists argue for a permanent
loss of consciousness definition.
Causes of Community Confusion

In the community there is some confusion over the terminology.
"Brain dead" is a term that may be applied in the technical sense of
permanent cessation of all function of the brain, but it may also be applied
to a person in permanent or persistent coma, to a person in a state of post
coma umesponsiveness, to a person in a state of minimal consciousness,
and, perhaps not entirely seriously, to someone with a bad hangover.
Mainstream Acceptance

Underlying these cultural differences within Australia would seem to
be several distinct notions about the significance of life, and hence of the
meaning of death. For some, the differences reflect a different
understanding of the ontology of a human being. That is to say, for some a
human being is only human to the extent that he or she continues to have
the patticularly human capacity for rational autonomy. For others, a human
being is a member of the human family whatever his or her capacities. The
former are likely to accept permanent loss of consciousness as death. The
latter tend to focus on the reality of the being continuing to live as an
integrated body. This latter view seems to have been the mainstream view
that saw the permanent cessation of all function of the brain.adopted as the
legal definition and distinguished this state from a state of permanent coma
and from a state of post coma unresponsiveness. The acceptance of the
diagnosis of death by the permanent loss of all brain function criterion
seems to have been based on the view that some brain function is necessary
to maintain the integration of the functions of the various patts or organs of
the body. There is another group who take a similar integrationist view to
the mainstream, but argue that there remains sufficient integration of the
body in a person with cardiac and supported respiratory function, even
after the brain has ceased all function .
Brain Death and Religion

Mainstream religious views generally accept the integrationist view,
seeing the human person as an embodied spirit. Loss of integration can be
accepted as reflecting a loss of the presence of a soul. The permanent loss
November, 2006
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of consciousness view is more likely to be adopted by those who take a
non-religious or materialist view of the human being.
Currently most of the Christian Churches have expressed an
acceptance of death according to the loss of all function of the brain
criterion. The notion that death may be diagnosed by a state of
permanent loss of consciousness while some brain function is retained
does not seem to have been addressed by the Christian Churches in any
authoritative way.
In 1985 the Islamic Organisation for Medical Sciences, meeting in
Kuwait, endorsed adopted brain death using the Harvard criteria for
determining that death of all functions of the brain had occUlTed. The
Congress ofIslamic Jurisprudence subsequently reviewed this favorably in
1986. 4
Judaism prohibits deriving benefit from mutilating or delaying the
burial of a corpse but this prohibition can be oven'idden to save a life. This
is variously interpreted in relation to diagnosing death and obtaining
organs for transplant.
Shintoism opposes the concept of brain death. Hinduism does not
have a formal structure of guidelines or edicts with respect to such issues.
As far as it is possible to ascertain their views on the matter, Hindu and
Vedic scholars accept the concept of brain death. The concept of gi ving or
daan is ingrained in Hindu thought. s
The immediate problem seems to be that the clinical criteria that
have become the medically accepted standard for determining death do not
exclude the possibility of what Veatch refers to as lingering integrative
brain functions. 6 These include the functions of the hypothalamic-pituitary
axis in the mid-brain that continue to bring about control of various organs,
•
and various other functions of the lower brain.
A response made to defend the clinical criteria for whole brain is
often to distinguish functions of the brain thought to be unimportant or
insignificant. This is the approach taken by the Australia and New Zealand
Intensive Care Society.7 A problem is that the criteria thus no longer match
the legal definition which depends on irreversible cessation of all functions
of the brain.
ANZICS also adopts a different definition of death than the legal
standard, stating
The term "brain death" should be used when death is certified
using the brain function criteria. Brain death is established by the
documentation of irreversible coma and ilTeversible loss of brain
stem reflex responses and respiratory centre function or by the
demonstration of the cessation of intracranial blood flow. (p. 7)
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The cunent situation thus would seem to be open to legal challenge.
The danger that I perceive is that the making of distinctions between
important and unimportant brain functions is to some extent subjective and
perhaps arbitrary and it is also becoming less and less distinguishable from
the notion that death is simply a state of ineversible loss of consciousness.
This view is problematic for two reasons:
a) There are some philosophical and theological leaps to be made if
one is to make human life synonymous with mental functioning
including an acceptance of either materialism or dualism. The
implication for us would seem to be a rejection of the Council of
Vienne that adopted the BoethiuslAquinas notion of the unity that
is the human person.
b) Ineversible loss of consciousness is not a diagnosable state.
Consciousness is an inference we draw from a person 's behavior.
Loss of consciousness is not an observable or measurable
phenomenon.
The approach I have advocated is that we should retain the definition
of death as the loss of all functions of the brain and that that agreed
definition be properly applied. The clinical tests are thus just a part of the
process to confirm that the loss of brain function does indeed extend to the
lower brain. The clinical criteria ought not, on their own, be taken as
determinative of death. They are tests only for some of the lower brain
functions and not tests for brain function generally nor even for all lower
brain functions. It is my understanding that it is the practice of cautious
physicians not to depend on the clinical criteria alone but .ather to depend
on their knowledge of the nature of the injury and the processes by which
destruction of the brain may occur and on the basis of a judgment, often
supported by ancillary testing, to reach a conclusion that cessation of all
brain function has occuned, before instituting the confirmatory routine of
the specified clinical tests.
This is consistent with the view taken by Pope John Paul 118:
It is a well-known fact that for some time certain scientific
approaches to ascertaining death have shifted the emphasis from
the traditional cardio-respiratory signs to the so-called
"neurological" criterion . Specifically, this consists in establishing,
according to clearly determined parameters commonly held by the
international scientific community, the complete and irreversible
cessation of all brain activity (in the cerebrum, cerebellum and
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brain stem). This is then considered the sign that the individual
organism has lost its integrative capacity.
With regard to the parameters used today for asceltaining death whether the "encephalic" signs or the more traditional cardiorespiratory signs - the Church does not make technical decisions.
She limits herself to the Gospel duty of comparing the data
offered by medical science with the Christian understanding of the
unity of the person, bringing out the similarities and the possible
conflicts capable of endangering respect for human dignity.

Different Approaches to Brain Death:
Disaggregators
Death is a process not a single event and it is a question of when
changes in behavior are penniued, not death event (Peter Singer)
Integrationists
l. Loss of all brain function (Harvard, President's Commission,
Royal Colleges, Human Tissue Acts)
2. Somaticists - no integration at organ level (Alan Shewmon)
Mentalists or mental integrationists
Permanent lost consciousness or ilTeversible coma (sometimes
coupled with loss of spontaneous respiration) - ANZICS, Robert
Veatch?
Ethical [ssues in Explaining Brain Death
When discussing brain death, health professiona~s need to bear in
mind that the understanding that a person has may simply lack information
about the medical reality that has occurred when the brain is destroyed, but
there may also be cultural differences that lead to different levels of
acceptance of the concept of determining death by the brain function
criterion. Those differences may be particularly confusing if there are
different uses of the termjnology amongst health professionals.
In principle, health professionals should only apply the term "brain
death" to those circumstances in which it has been determjned, by those
who are qualified to make the diagnosis, that there is permanent cessation
of all function of the brain. They should take great care to distinguish this
state from those various states in which there is severe brain damage, and
even permanent loss of consciousness, but some continuing brain
functions .

334

Linacre Quarterly

In the process of dealing with informing a family of the diagnosis of
brain death, it is reasonable that members of the family have the
opportunity to see one of the testing processes taking place.
The practice, sometimes employed, of ancillary testing to produce
evidence of lack of blood circulation to the brain, such as an ultrasound
image or an X-Ray image using contrast medium, may greatly benefit the
process both at the time and subsequently when the trauma of events and
later grieving may otherwise affect understanding and acceptance.
2.4 Use of less than suitable organs
There is a growing tendency to use organs that would once have been
considered not suitable for use. This is partly due to changes in the ability
to control rejection and partly due to demand for organs and confidence in
the outcomes.
This does raise justice questions about who gets the better or the less
than ideal organs. It also raises questions about whether the patient is
infooned about the quality of the organ being provided.
There are also attempts to match features so that an older person is
more likely to be given an organ from an older donor, a person who is
already tested positive for a transmissible disease may be given an organ
from a person with the same disease.
These matters raise questions for the organ allocation algorithms as
well as the overall safety of organ transplantation.
2.5 Justice and organ allocation
The diffeling approaches to the allocation of organs and the weight
given to the factors involved in the algorithm raise justice considerations
and questions to do with equal access to health care and omwhat basis one
might discriminate.
The key principle underpinning the allocation process is that there
should be no discrimination between potential recipients on the basis of:
a) race, nationality, religious belief, gender, marital status, sexual
orientation, logistics, social status, disability or age (except where
conditions associated with the patient's age directly determine the
likelihood of a poorer outcome);
b) linkage with willingness of family to be donors (after death);
c) the patient's need for a transplant arising from past behavior;
d) capacity to pay; or
e) willingness to participate in experimentation, except where it is a
trial for a novel transplant procedure that requires follow-up and audit.
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Allocation of organs is a complex process that depends on a range of
factors besides medical need and capacity to benefit. There is an
unpredictable element in the process in that organs have to be matched to
recipients. This means that potential recipients may remain on waiting lists
for variable periods of time unrelated to their medical need, but dependent
upon a matched organ becoming available.
Transplant units should use organs as best they can, and balance
medical need with likelihood of successful transplantation. It is legitimate
that the following criteria be taken into account in considering potential
recipients:
a) length of time waiting for a transplant, taken from the time that
illness progressed to a point that a transplant would be of
immediate benefit;
b) important medical factors , such as the closeness of tissuematching and matching of organ quality with the patient's medical
status to maximize the likelihood of success;
c) the urgency of a transplant given the likely rate of degeneration
of health without transplant therapy, especially if patient survival is
immediately threatened by that degeneration;
d) need in terms of how sick the patient is without transplant
therapy, and the prospects for
e) transplant therapy producing a better outcome;
t) logistic factors in making the transplant available to the recipient
within the time frame;
g) whether the patient has dependents; and
h) whether the patient is reasonably likely (with or without
assistance) to comply with the treatment regime necessary to
secure graft survival.
2.6 The role of the designated officer
Different practices and greater sophistication between hospitals in
the various roles of the Designated Officer who canies the responsibility
for approving the procurement process in an institution, the transplant
coordinator and the donor coordinator have emerged.
In the various jurisdictions, designated officers have a role of
oversight of the organ procurement process. The task is, in reality, one of
ensuring that each of the necessary steps has been properly documented in
relation to the determination of death, the separation of clinical roles and
the obtaining of consent. The role is even more crucial in the circumstances
of donation after cardiac death in controlled circumstances.
Some hospitals retain this as a role for a senior medical administrator
who has been adequately trained in the ethical, legal and medical issues
336
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involved. Some delegate the role to the medical staff in the intensive care
unit, including relatively junior staff.
The arguments for delegation to juniors concern the need for
someone to be available at odd times and urgently.
The arguments against delegation to juniors concerns the fact that
this is an oversight role and involves the officer ensuring compliance with
the ethical, legal and medical standards. It is thought that such a person
needs to have the authority to provide that oversight and that may be
difficult for a relatively junior person.
There are also numerous issues to do with the timing of
approaches to families for donation and who should make that
approach. There are two schools of thought as to whether those who are
caring for the donor should be the first to broach the question, given
that the matter of donation potentiality could be seen to compromise
care of the patient. On the other hand they have an established
relationship with the family. There are also questions as to when the
donor coordinators become involved, whether before or after the
information is given and consent obtained.

2.7 Mutual consent to donor family-recipient contact
The procurement of organs from deceased persons has developed as
an anonymous process to protect recipients and donor families from
unwarranted intrusion into their privacy.
A negative aspect of that is that rather than giving and receiving, with
all its humanness, the anonymity has meant that the process, for the
participants, has been more like taking and getting organs.
Also confusing the matter is that without that information recipients
may fantasize about the nature of the person from whom the organ came
including race, gender, etc. Donor families may envisage that the
personality of the donor somehow continues in the recipients and that may
complicate grieving. Donor hearts and eyes seem to be significant subjects
of fantasy in that respect.
In recent years efforts have been made by the donor and transplant
co-ordinators to facilitate the exchange of non-identifying information by
way of recipients sending anonymous letters of thanks to donor families
and reports being given of how well recipients are doing.
However there are people who would like to have more personal
contact. The latter does however raise the question of the possibility of
inappropriate contact and even possessiveness between grieving donor
family and recipients.
The suggestion has been that there be the possibility of a managed
process with mutual consent and access to counseling, much as there is
now with adoptee and relinquishing parent contact.
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Complicating all this is the fact that it is not difficult for
identification of donors to be made via death notices and coupling the day
of death and death notice information with other information that may be
available that would otherwise have been non-identifying. There may also
be news reports relating to a sudden death which allow linkage to be made.
Health professionals are bound by confidentiality on this matter, and
they can find themselves unable to provide the counseling and other
support that may be required once identification is made by the parties.
An argument for a mutual consent register is that it would allow a
well-conducted process to be established.

2.8 Information, consent and disclosure of material factors that
indicate donor identity
Information about a donor's age and state of health, other physical
attributes and manner of death may affect the quality of the organs
available for transplantation. That information would seem to be material
to the decision made by a recipient to accept or reject the offer of an organ
for transplant.
.
The provision of that information however does increase the
probability that the recipient could identify the donor. There is thus a
potential conflict between the duty of disclosure and the right to privacy
and the legal requirement of confidentiality. The question arises as to
whether it may be demanded that the recipient waive the right to receive
that material information as a condition of being on the list for
transplantation.

3. Issues in Living Donation
3.1 Bodily integrity and "donation" by children and other dependant
persons
There is a growing incidence of living related donation of organs or
tissue by children and by others in dependant relationships, such as adults
with cognitive impairment. This raises questions about a right to bodily
integrity, conflicts of interests for parents and guardians making decisions
for one family member to donate to another, and whether there is a need for
an independent detemunation that organ or tissue donation is in the donor's
best interests.
Donation by children is ethically complex. They will often be sought
as a donor to a sister or brother, particularly for bone marrow donation. It is
difficult and, in cases of very young children, impossible to ensure that
children have a full understanding of what is involved. Because of their
immaturity and dependence, children are very vulnerable and great care
must be taken to protect their interests. For these reasons, donation by
338
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children should only occur in circumstances in which it is thought the
donation is in that child's best interests.
Where parents make the decision, they will face the issue of whether
it is appropriate at all to subject one child to intrusive procedures and risks
for the sake of another. There is at stake a fundamental issue of respect for
the bodily integrity of a child. It ought not be the case that a living child's
body or body parts are seen as a mere resource for another child.
Irrespective of the needs of another, each child has a right to bodily
integrity and thus not to be invaded.
However, the death of a sister or brother may be such a serious tlu'eat
to the well-being of a potential donor that their overall interests would be
more damaged by their sibling's death than by the discomforts of, say. a
bone man-ow transplant. In that case becoming a donor may be in the donor
child 's best interests and thus consistent with respect for the integrity of
that child.
As a child matures, he or she will be able to have a better
understanding of such matters and a clearer appreciation of the
significance of his or her own decisions. Hence, although legally still a
minor, an older child may in practice take a more active part in such
decision-making than a younger child.
Some people see the family as an intimate group in which the
interests of one member are strongly linked to the interests of all: they
argue that the good of the family as a whole is more important than the
interests of only one member. But this argument and the balancing of
interests within a family must occur within limits and one of those limits is
respect for bodily integrity.
Decisions to permit a child to be a living donor will only be ethically
acceptable where:
,
a) the risks to the child donor are minimal;
b) the donation is to a person - such as a sibling - with whom the
child has an intimate relationship;
c) the donation is a last resort in treatment for the recipient;
d) the proposed transplant is of proven efficacy and such expected
benefit to the recipient, and thus indirectly to his or her sibling, and
the risks and discomforts for the donor child so minimal, that an
independent judgment is made that donating the organ or tissue on
behalf of the donor child is in his or her best interests;
e) the parents consent and the child (if she or he is able to do so)
agrees or assents - the child's understanding of the donation and
transplantation may be incomplete, but efforts must be made to
ensure that his or her understanding is as thorough as possible,
consistent with his or her age; and
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t) where required by law, a court or tribunal authorization has been
obtained to undertake a non-therapeutic procedure on a child on
the basis that the procedure is in that child's interests.

The same issues may arise for decisions to take organs from adult
persons with cognitive impairment and in dependant relationships.

3.2 Donors of greater health risk
There is a trend toward accepting donors who have health
assessments that indicate increased risks to them following donation, for
instance, conditions such as raised sugar levels or hypertension or a family
hi story of disease or genetic predisposition that indicate a greater risk to
them of loss of function following donation .
The trend occurs in both related and unrelated donation . A wellmotivated person may be prepared to donate despite the risks, especially in
the circumstances of a close relative in need .
There may also be circumstances in which a donor may be prepared
to lose a function for the sake of a recipient. The latter may be particularly
the case for a parent donating to a child or between spouses.
The question arises as to whether there are professional ethical limits
to donation beyond the requirement that the donor has made a free and
informed choice. The traditional principle has been that a medical
professional should first do no harm (primum non nocerre).
Some organs, such as a partial liver (especially the right lobe) or the
lobe of a lung may involve greater risk to the donor than has customarily
been considered to be medically acceptable. One could also envisage a
person donating a cornea and thus losing the function of binocular vision.
Arguments for allowing significant harm or tisk t~ donors may be:
a)

A simple risk-benefit analysis in which one simply aggregates
risk and benefit to the parties involved and calculates an overall
benefit may be offered as justification on the grounds of utility.

b)

The self-identification of a person 's interests with those of his or
her child, or with a spouse or partner, may also be offered as
justification for a likely significant harm or risk to the donor,
which would otherwise be considered unacceptable.

An argument against allowing significant harm or risk to donors
issue is the fact that transplantation involves a team of health professionals
having professional obligations to the donor and to the community to
practice medicine in a way that preserves personal and bodily integrity.
Consent is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for medical
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intervention. Medicine has its own standards of what may be considered
professionally acceptable conduct.
The taking of regenerative tissue or the taking of a kidney when a
person is well and would retain adequate renal function through the
remaining kidney have been considered satisfactory because the risk of
long term harm is minimal and because the removal involved no loss of
functional integrity.
Arguably left lobe liver (mortality rate of around 1:500) or lung lobe
donation are in this category, though the risks of left liver lobe removal are
relatively high and the removal of a lung lobe does diminish lung capacity
and hence some function as well as being otherwise risky.
There may be a distinction between losing functions altogether and
merely diminishing functions that may be applied to lung lobe removal.
This prompts questions such as whether it would be legitimate for a
spouse to donate a hand to a partner who had lost both hands? They would
then both have one hand and that may be better for them as a couple on
utilitarian grounds, but would that loss of function be an acceptable
outcome from the perspective of it being deliberately caused by surgical
intervention?
Consent of the victim is not a defense to causing grievous bodily
harm. The presumption in organ donation has been that the donor is left
functionally intact. The 2001 Catholic Health Australia Code of Ethical
Standards 9 (n. 3.18), following in the Catholic Tradition expresses it:
Donation of non-regenerative tissue is only permissible when this
will not impair function, be detrimental to the discharge of the
donor 's responsibilities, or involve serious danger to the donor's
life, future health or identity.

•

A violent husband may still be prosecuted even if his wife returns to
him and to the abusive relationship and she refuses to assist prosecution.
Blood sports are, by and large, prohibited even between consenting adults.
(Note that boxing is an exception but is meant to be regulated and to be
undertaken wearing gloves that minimize harm and to be refereed such that
fights are stopped when someone is badly hurt).
In those terms taking an organ from a loving, consenting donor does
raise a question as to whether that is permissible when the removal would
cause loss of function or grave risk to health or life.

3.3 Paired and remunerated living donation
Paired and remunerated living "donation". Paired donation occurs
when a family member wants to donate but there is not compatibility, so
instead they donate the organ to others in exchange for a compatible donor
being found for their relative. That raises an issue as to whether that
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constitutes trade in human organs. There is pressure for governments to
provide financial compensation to living donors for time lost from work
and other financial costs to them. It is suggested that a distinction may be
made between financial compensation in that respect and paying them for
the organ or tissue.
The CHA Code of Ethical Standards (n. 3.16) expresses it thus:
Parts of the human body are not to be treated as commodities.
Trade in human body parts is unacceptable, as is any other
disrespectful use of the organs or tissues of a living or deceased
person.

In principle, a person offering an organ in exchange for a relative
receiving a compatible organ from someone else is a trade in a human body
part. Is it somehow different and ought it to be allowed or facilitated by
establishing a register for such exchanges to occur?
3.4 Internet canvassing for organs - privacy, exploitation and justice
issues
The use of the internet to canvas donation of an organ from unrelated
living donors has resulted in an inability of the medical teams to protect
anonymity and prevent exploitation of one party by another. The justice
issues involved in some patients being better placed to secure a donor than
others and the inequalities of access thus generated. It is also difficult when
there are prior anangements between donors and recipients to prevent
persons asking for or accepting payment for their organs.

References
1. J. Cooper, T. Chin, N. Krieger, L. Fernandez, D. Foley, Y. Becker. J. Odorico, S.
Knechtle, M. Kalayoglu , H. Sollinger, A. D' Alessandro, "Donation After Cardiac
Death: The University of Wisconsin Experience With Renal Transplantation,"
American Journal of Transplantation 2004; 4: 1490-1494.
G. Koostra, "The Asystolic, or Non-HeartBeating Donor," Transplantation 1997;
63:917-21.
"Categories of Non-Heart-beating Donors," Transplantation Proceedings 1995; 27 :
2893.
S. Sudhindran, G. Pettigrew. A. Drain, M. Shotri, C.J. Watson, N.Y. Jamieson, J.A.
Bradley, "Outcome of Transplantation Using Kidneys From Controlled (Maastricht
Category 3) Non-Heart Beating Donors" Clinical Trans-plantation 2003 ; 17:93100.

342

Linacre Quarterly

M. Weber, D. Daniel. N. Demartines, P. Ambuhl, P-A Clavi en. "Kidney
Transplantation From Donors Without A Heart Beat," New England loumal of
Medicine 2002; 347: 248-255.
P. Abt, M. Crawford, N. Desai, J. Markmann, K. Olthoff, A. Shaked.
"Transplantation From Non-Heart Beating Donors : An Increased Incidence of
Biliary Complications," TraNsplantation 2003; 76: 1714-171 9.
S. Steen, T. Sjoberg, L. Piene, Q. Liao, L. Eriksson, L. Algotsson, "Transplantation
of Lungs From A Non-Heart Beating Donor," Lancet 2001; 357 (9529) 925.
2. G. Koostra, "The Asystolic, or Non-He3I1Beating Donor," TransplanTation 1997 ;
63:917-21
3. "Guidelines for the Determination of Death," Report of the medical consultants
on the diagnosis of death to the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, lAMA, 246. 1981.
4. G.K. Pande, P.K. Patnaik, S. Gupta, P. Salmi, "Brain Death and Organ
Transplantation in India,"' National Medical lournal of India, New Delhi. 1990.
5. Sanjay Nagral "Ethics of Organ Transplantation" Indian lournal of Medical
Ethics. Volume 3 Number 2, April- June 1995.
6. Robert M. Veatch "The Death of Whole Brain Death: The Plague of the
Dissaggregatirs, Somaticists, and Mentalists, lournal of Philosophy and Medicine
30: 353-378,200
7. Australian and New Zealand Intensive Care Society, Recommendations on Brain
Death and Organ Donation, Second Edition 1998
8. Address of John Paul II to the 18th International Congress of the,Transplantation
Society, Tuesday 29 August 2000
9. http://www.cha.org.au/site.php?id=407

November, 2006

343

